


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NSA review completed



Thirty-Ninth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS(This report covers the period from
14 November through 20 November 1973)*This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.***Secret**

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21 November 1973

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Special Note

Evidence received too late for inclusion in the body of this report indicates that the North Vietnamese have resumed the flow of troop infiltration to the B-3 Front. On 21 November, Group 3006 was detected at Binh Tram 8 in North Vietnam with 601 troops. This is the first regular group to be detected traveling to this area since last March and supports the validity of the 11 November intercepted message (see the text) which indicated that Hanoi would soon begin heavy infiltration to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas. Communist combat units in these regions have a greater need for fillers and replacement troops than elsewhere in South Vietnam, and the detection of Group 3006 probably signifies the beginning of a North Vietnamese effort to remedy this.



21 November 1973

Thirty-Ninth Report**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS***

(This report covers the week from
14 through 20 November 1973)

The Key Points

- No new regular or special-purpose infiltration groups were detected in the infiltration system last week, but an intercepted North Vietnamese message suggests that the rate of infiltration may increase markedly in the near future.
- Communist logistic activity in southern North Vietnam increased during the reporting period, but North Vietnamese supply shipments elsewhere in Indochina were light.
- Recent photographic intelligence shows some additional Communist road construction in southern Laos and western South Vietnam, as well as further improvements to the Khe Sanh airfield.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.



Preface

This report is the thirty-ninth in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

DETAILS

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. For the first time since mid-September, no new regular or special-purpose infiltration groups were detected during the week at any point in the infiltration system. Thus the number of North Vietnamese troops who have started south since 1 September remains at 26,500, most of whom were sent to southern Laos and adjacent areas. As shown in the following table, the infiltration total since 1 September lags behind that of the comparable period a year ago. In addition, by the latter part of November 1972, Hanoi had dispatched 24,000 troops to combat units in South Vietnam, compared with only 4,000 since 1 September 1973.

**Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September - 20 November**

	1972	1973
Total	32,500	26,500
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	10,500	2,000
MR 5	4,500	2,000
B-3 Front	2,000	0
COSVN	7,000	0
Southern Laos/MR 559	8,500	22,500

2. The pace of infiltration to South Vietnam may accelerate dramatically in the near future, however, and large numbers of combat troops may be dispatched to central and southern South Vietnam over the next six months. According to an intercepted message of 11 November between two high-level North Vietnamese entities in the Laotian Panhandle, Hanoi is planning to send more than 11,000 troops per month to the B-3 Front and COSVN -- the areas most in need of replacement personnel -- during the period December-May. If the plan is followed and indeed represents total infiltration to the B-3 Front and COSVN, some 68,000 troops would be sent to these areas during the 1973-74 infiltration cycle. This level would equal infiltration starts to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas during the comparable 1971-72 period, and would be a significant increase over the some 40,000 troops who started south during the 1972-73

cycle. To accommodate infiltration on this scale, Hanoi would draw on men conscripted during the recruitment campaign of last August and September and probably would have to conduct a large campaign in December.

3. If the forecast is accurate – and it should be pointed out that the new message is in direct contradiction to an earlier message which suggested that a total of only 13,000 infiltrators would be dispatched to the B-3 Front and COSVN through March – this manpower would enable the Communists to reinforce under-strength units and build a sizable reserve in both regions. Some troops would begin arriving in the highlands in January, while others should begin reaching the COSVN area in the following month. MAP 515529 shows the current distribution of Communist, as well as South Vietnamese, combat forces by military region.

Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

4. Developments in southern North Vietnam highlighted Communist logistic activity last week, as supply movements increased noticeably. For example, on 14 November elements of Binh Tram (BT) 26 in Quang Binh Province reported transporting more than 100 tons of mortar and antiaircraft artillery ammunition to a storage area south of Quang Khe. This unit also reported that it had some 500 tons of supplies in storage, including nearly 400 tons of "military supplies," probably ordnance. Two days later, elements of BT-26 reportedly received more than 115 tons of ammunition on 13 railroad cars, including 40 tons of 122-mm artillery ammunition. The above shipments are the largest detected in the last several weeks and probably are a part of the "large transportation effort" scheduled to begin on 15 November. These new ordnance deliveries, as well as supplies already in stockpiles in southern North Vietnam, should begin to flow into southern Laos, weather permitting, in the near future.

5. For the present, however, North Vietnamese supply movements are at a low level in southern Laos, where rainy weather continues to restrict traffic on the road network. Typical of the reports noted was a 17 November intercept from a unit in the Laotian Panhandle which stated that "it rained during the day so there were a lot of problems traveling on the roads." This message confirmed 8 November photography which showed that the major roads in southern Laos, including the new, partly completed dual-lane route (see Map 501958), are still in poor condition from wet weather and show little signs of use.

6. Logistic activity was also at a low level in northern South Vietnam. A North Vietnamese engineer regiment in northern Quang Tri reported that it had been unable to make sufficient progress in its bridge

Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA¹ RVNAF²

190,000 320,000

VC/NVA

92,000

325th
324B
320B
304th
711th
2nd

RVNAF

89,000

VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces

MR 2

VC/NVA

34,000

320th
10th
3rd

RVNAF

68,000

23rd
22nd
Regional
Forces

MR 3

VC/NVA

39,000

429th Sapper
Command
9th
7th
5th

RVNAF

75,000

25th
18th
5th
Regional
Forces

MR 4

VC/NVA

25,000

1st


RVNAF

88,000

21st
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.



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repair operations and that travel through its area was impossible. Intercepted messages also revealed that sections of Communist Route 14 in Thua Thien Province near the A Shau Valley are still closed.

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

South Vietnam

7. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, since 15 June, and for the last week (14-20 November) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since 27 January Cease-fire		Total Since 15 June Cease-fire		Last Week (14-20 Nov)	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Total	3,949	25,224	1,580	11,269	67(43) ¹	463(481) ¹
MR 1	1,451	5,227	426	1,868	8	55
MR 2	637	4,206	373	2,352	17	76
MR 3	598	4,478	196	1,902	8	79
MR 4	1,263	11,313	585	5,147	34	253

1. Figures in parenthesis denote totals of the previous week.


8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the charts following the Annex, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

Laos

9. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

10. Recent aerial photography over Laos and South Vietnam showed that the Communists have made additional road and airfield improvements in certain areas. The new developments include:



- ***Khe Sanh Airfield*** Newly installed metal plating is being laid down over the repaired former US air strip adjacent to the airfield built by the Communists since the cease-fire. Photography [] indicated that about half of the old air strip had already been covered. When the new surfacing is finished, this shorter and narrower landing field probably will serve as a taxiway or backup strip. Although the North Vietnamese have not yet, to our knowledge, flown any aircraft into Khe Sanh, the work on the second strip clearly indicates that they plan to do so in the future.
- ***Route 14-Related Construction Along the Western Border of South Vietnam*** Photographic coverage [] over western Darlac Province shows continued clearing activity on a new road leading north from Route 309 toward the current terminus of the Communist Route 14 dual-lane system some 12 miles farther north. This clearing activity is probably in preparation for a further extension of Route 14 into southern Darlac and Quang Duc Provinces. The photography also showed considerable signs of activity by tracked vehicles in the vicinity of O Rang, Cambodia, a long-established Communist border base area, as well as on portions of Route 14 in the vicinity of Dak Dam. Such evidence probably reflects the passage of Communist tanks used in heavy fighting in early November and in the subsequent capture of several South Vietnamese outposts in the area.
- ***North-South Dual-Lane Road in Southern Laos*** [] photography [] shows a new 2-1/2 mile extension of the new dual-lane road being built through the Laotian Panhandle. This new segment, cleared [] [] brings the new route to within 10 miles of the tri-border area, where it is expected eventually to link up with the Route 14 dual-lane road inside South Vietnam.

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ANNEX

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL
TO THE SOUTH SINCE THE CEASE-FIRE

No new regular or special-purpose groups were initially observed in the infiltration pipeline during the past week, and our estimates of infiltration starts remain the same. Since the 15 June second cease-fire, more than 34,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated south, some 32,000 of whom have been combat troops and 2,000 of whom have been specialists. In the period since 27 January, more than 84,000 personnel have infiltrated southward, including more than 76,000 combat troops and about 8,000 specialists. Some 59,000 of these personnel have started south since 27 January, while 25,000 were in the pipeline moving southward as of that date. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese infiltrators starting south, by month, since 1 January 1973.


**Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Destined for South Vietnam, Southern
Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1973**

	Total	Special-Purpose
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June	2,200	700
July	3,650	600
August	2,200	700
September	7,000	0
October	14,325	325
November 1-20	5,675	175



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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